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Abstract: The reallocation of radio spectrum to valuable new and emerging technologies 
and services is essential to achieving the next wave of productivity and consumer benefits 
driven by ICT. Currently spectrum is not allocated to the most valuable uses, particularly 
the large amount of spectrum held for government use, and command and control 
management cannot respond fully or quickly in reallocating spectrum. To achieve a more 
economically efficient allocation and the greatest overall benefit market mechanisms 
including trading and spectrum pricing must be introduced. Complementary reforms in 
areas other than spectrum management will be required, and the appropriate boundary 
between market and non-market allocation mechanisms need to be established. Setting 
clear principles regarding the market/non-market boundary will help in resisting the 
inevitable rent seeking by incumbents and potential entrants during the transition to 
market mechanisms. Countries that do not face up to these challenges and move quickly 
will see their citizens disadvantaged as spectrum becomes a key economic resource. 
Key words: spectrum policy, auctions, trading, spectrum pricing, digital switchover, real 
options, public sector use and licence exempt use. 
 
adio spectrum is an increasingly valuable resource for wireless and 
mobile applications, yet historical allocations of spectrum and 
methods of allocation and reallocation are both inefficient and slow 
to adapt. Substantial spectrum resources are in effect hoarded by 
government, aviation and military users with little consideration of the 
opportunity cost to the wider economy. In considering how to reform 
spectrum management to ensure that spectrum is allocated to the most 
valuable uses market mechanisms such as auctions, trading and spectrum 
pricing should play a central role. 
Yet progress internationally in moving from command and control to 
spectrum markets has been slow and partial, with limited application to 
government use including the military for example. The cost to welfare in 
terms of foregone services and productivity growth is likely to be very large, 
with ICT currently contributing around half of overall productivity growth in 
R 
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the US and Europe, and growing scope for wireless to contribute to the 
networked economy. 
This paper focuses on the potential role of spectrum markets, barriers to 
introducing market mechanisms and the optimal boundary between market 
and other allocation mechanisms. False arguments are often made for the 
continued use of administrative allocation processes and we distinguish 
between these and legitimate arguments. These issues have arisen, or are 
arising, in a number of countries in relation to the allocation of spectrum 
released by digital switchover in particular. 
Digital switchover also illustrates path dependence between decisions, 
with early decisions resulting in irreversible commitments which can reduce 
flexibility to respond to future technological developments, particularly where 
early decisions involve public service broadcasting. We conclude that 
introducing market mechanisms on their own is not enough to deliver optimal 
outcomes. There needs to be parallel reform of other institutional 
arrangements including government funding of public sector users of 
spectrum in moving to markets. Where administrative decisions are required 
irreversibility needs to be explicitly taken into account. 
  Benefits of applying markets to radio spectrum 
Radio spectrum is a scarce and essential input to the networked 
economy. It is therefore important to ensure that spectrum assignment and 
allocation adapt to changing demand and reflect the value of alternative 
uses and users. Radio spectrum policy should be seen in the broader 
context of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) which has 
made a substantial contribution to increased productivity growth in some 
regions, but not others, since the mid-1990s as can be seen in Figure 1 
(WILLIAMSON, 2007).  
Part of the explanation for these differences in the impact of ICT lies in 
the flexibility with which business and government processes can be 
adapted to make effective use of ICT. Labour and product market flexibility 
appear particularly important to facilitating the "creative destruction" required 
to utilise ICT effectively and efficiently, and to get a large payoff from 
investment in ICT (McMORROW & VEUGELERS, 2005). 
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Figure1 - ICT contribution to productivity growth 
 
The capabilities of existing fixed and mobile access infrastructure may 
increasingly prove to be a constraint on the networked economy as 
distributed data access grows, and particularly if existing regulatory 
arrangements act as a constraint and/or provide investors with insufficient 
confidence to invest. Spectrum markets and pricing could therefore play a 
significant role in facilitating the reallocation of spectrum to meet such new 
demands. 
The proponents of a market approach generally argue their position from 
first principles. It seems self evident to an economist that if users (and 
regulators) do not face any cost for the use of a resource such as spectrum 
then they have little, if any, incentive to adopt the economically efficient 
technology or to allocate spectrum to the highest value uses (FAULHABER, 
2006). 
An illustrative example of existing spectrum use that appears very 
inefficient when the value of spectrum in alternative uses is considered is 
aeronautical radar. Aeronautical radar in the UK involves a relatively old 
technology (magnetron radars), and more efficient alternative technologies 
are available such as the use of filter technology, different waveform 
techniques or a combination of the two 1. 
There is evidence (INDEPEN & AEGIS, 2007) that over 270 MHz of 
spectrum – more than twice the amount released by digital switchover in the 
UK – could be released for mobile and WiMAX applications whilst 
maintaining aeronautical radar services. It appears this could be done at 
very modest cost relative to estimates of the value of such spectrum which is 
                     
1 Whilst the use of ultra narrow band (continuous wave) transmissions would reduce 
requirements to only 10% of the amount of spectrum required by pulsed radars, this technology 
is not likely to be available for another 15 years. 
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estimated to be around £0.84m/MHz for the UK. Table 1 summarises the 
calculations. 
Table 1 - Costs of reducing spectrum requirements for aeronautical radar  
by applying new waveforms and filters 
 L Band  
(1.24-1.35 GHz) 
S-Band  
(2.7-3.1 GHz) 
Ku-Band  
(15.4-15.7 GHz) 
Cost £11.7m £43.2-128.2m (*) £0.8m 
Spectrum released 70 MHz 200 MHz 200 MHz 
Maximum annualised cost/MHz 
(assuming 10% discount rate & 
15 year discount period) 
£0.02m/MHz £0.03-0.08m/MHz £0.0005m/MHz 
(*) The low end of the range is the cost for civil radars only.  The high end includes military 
radars assuming the cost per radar is the same as for civil radars.  Some NATS radars may 
already have this capability and so costs are overstated.  Also costs of military radar conversion 
may be less than those for conversion of civil radars if there is less cost of downtime. 
Source: INDEPEN & AEGIS (2007),  
based on analysis of radar technologies by QINETIQ et al (2004)  
If these results apply in a relatively densely populated country with a 
sizeable aeronautical industry like the UK, we suspect similar gains could 
also be made elsewhere. Achieving such gains across countries would be 
necessary if the spectrum is to be released for services on an international 
basis. 
However, in the absence of incentives to economise on spectrum in the 
aeronautical sector the status quo will tend to dominate administrative 
decisions, particularly in Europe where air traffic control is fragmented 
between national administrations. An illustration of the tendency to support 
the status quo is European opposition to proposals to allow the allocation of 
the 2.7-2.9 GHz band to advanced mobile services (OFCOM, 2007a). 
A shift to greater reliance on market mechanisms including spectrum 
trading and/or spectrum fees reflecting the opportunity cost of spectrum in 
relation to aeronautical radar could result the reallocation of spectrum to a 
range of mobile applications with substantial benefits. 
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  The implementation of spectrum markets is limited  
The extent of application of market mechanisms to spectrum in practice 
is generally limited despite the potential benefits. While numerous countries 
have used auctions to assign licences for mobile and wireless access 
services, relatively few countries have gone beyond this to implement 
reforms to create spectrum access rights that can be freely traded and that 
allow change of use or technology (i.e. that are liberalised).   
Trading and liberalisation policies have been implemented for some time 
and/or in numerous frequency bands in Australia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
New Zealand, Norway, the UK and the US (ANALYSYS et al., 2004; WIK, 
2005; OVUM, INDEPEN & AEGIS, 2006). In most cases implementation has 
been partial and limited to newly auctioned spectrum (e.g. New Zealand) or 
a limited number of frequency bands (e.g. New Zealand, Norway, the UK 
and the US), and to commercial users (e.g. the UK, US, New Zealand).   
In the US by 2002 only 7% of the spectrum in the 300 MHz to 3 GHz 
range (i.e. the most valuable spectrum) was available for market allocation. 
In those countries where government users may enter markets they have 
generally not done so (e.g. Australia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Norway). 
A possible reason for the lack of participation may be the way in which gains 
from spectrum sales would be treated in the overall budget process. 
Alternatively, resources that have an opportunity cost may receive less 
scrutiny than actual cash expenditure on spectrum. If the latter is the case 
spectrum pricing may be an important substitute or complement to trading, 
particularly in relation to government use.  
Of course, to the extent that there is trading in proxies for spectrum, such 
as network capacity (for example, broadcast multiplex capacity) or buying 
and selling of companies to obtain access to spectrum, the extent of trading 
may be more extensive than it first appears.  
However, if we take the example of the UK, where there has been a clear 
policy direction, changes have taken at least a decade to be implemented.  
Arguably the move towards market approaches started in 1994 with the 
release of a consultation paper by the government titled "The Future 
Management of Radio Spectrum" and this lead to new legislation (the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1998) allowing spectrum pricing and auctions in 
1998. 
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In 2001 the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry 
commissioned an independent review of spectrum policy which advocated 
the broad application of market approaches to spectrum management 
(CAVE 2002). Spectrum trading was first introduced in December 2004 and 
is being incrementally extended each year, starting with bands used for 
private mobile communications and fixed wireless access. However, the 
OFCOM (2004) announcement did not propose the introduction of trading for 
2G and 3G mobile spectrum until 2007. In 2004 the Treasury commissioned 
an independent audit of spectrum use by the public sector which has 
resulted in numerous specific actions, including the use of market 
mechanisms, aimed at improving the efficiency of spectrum use by the 
public sector (CAVE, 2005). 
Why has it taken so long to achieve these changes?  Is it just resistance 
by powerful incumbent interests or is developing new rights more complex 
than it first appears? In the remainder of this paper we seek to identify some 
of the real problems in moving to markets and the wider policy and 
institutional implications. 
  Distinguishing real versus false problems in moving to 
a market based approach 
From a public policy perspective some of the claimed problems in 
developing market based approaches are real, and some are imagined or 
simply self serving. It is essential to distinguish between the two. 
False arguments 
Arguments that are sometimes made against the introduction of market 
based policies but that are not persuasive concern the claimed benefits from 
the services provided justifying "free" access to spectrum, and concerns 
about monopolisation and under use of spectrum if markets are applied 
(CAVE, 2006). 
Contribution of spectrum using services to the economy 
A frequent argument is that a particular sector makes a large contribution 
to GDP and employment, including indirect impacts on the economy, and 
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therefore deserves special access to spectrum such as spectrum 
reservations and access at low or no cost. An illustrative general example is 
the discussion of potential positive market externalities in relation to aviation 
in a report by the ATAG (2005). 
Arguments regarding indirect economic or employment benefits, unless 
they relate to genuine (so called non-pecuniary) externalities such as 
pollution, are almost always spurious. Macroeconomic or second round 
effects normally represent a re-distribution of resources within the economy, 
without any net overall economic effect (BAUMOL & OATES, 1998; and 
BOARDMAN et al, 2006). In other words, the private valuation of spectrum 
expressed at auction, in trading and in response to spectrum pricing will 
reflect the social value. 
External costs and benefits 
Economic activity may also have negative or positive impacts on welfare 
and production that are not mediated by the market, for example, impacts 
via congestion, acoustic noise, radio interference and public service 
broadcasting, which is considered to have wider benefits in many countries. 
These are legitimate public policy concerns. However, the fact that an 
externality arises in relation to the production of outputs utilising spectrum as 
an input is not an argument for not relying on (or modifying) market 
instruments to manage spectrum inputs. 
DIAMOND & MIRRLEES (1971) developed the general argument that in 
setting policy to maximise welfare in a second-best situation it is not 
desirable to tax (or subsidise) the use of inputs. Whilst it is in principle 
possible to address an externality by modifying the price of all inputs in an 
appropriate way, this is in practice infeasible given the information and 
practical constraints on achieving efficient outcomes via the modification of 
input prices (HOLTERMANN, 1976; HELFAND, 1999). 
So what should be done? In sectors such as aviation that produce 
greenhouse gas emissions taxes or permits targeted directly at these 
emissions would be the appropriate response (INDEPEN & AEGIS, 2007). In 
such instances measures to address the externality need not accompany the 
introduction of spectrum markets or pricing, and should be separately 
considered on their merits. In the broadcasting sector a range of 
interventions targeted at the desired output (namely public service 
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broadcasting) are available, including direct funding (INDEPEN & AEGIS, 
2005).  
Monopolisation 
Another strand of argument for intervention in the allocation of spectrum 
is that a market based approach would result in excessive market power in 
either the spectrum market or the final service market via monopolisation of 
the scarce spectrum input. A scarce input can lead to market power, but this 
problem is not unique to spectrum, for example, holdings of land by 
supermarkets in the UK have been investigated using general competition 
powers.  Further, potential concerns over competition need not be a barrier 
to the introduction of market based approaches to spectrum allocation, 
provided they are explicitly addressed in policy design.  
General competition law provisions might be judged adequate in 
addressing such concerns. If not, other interventions such as limitations on 
the amount of spectrum individual firms can acquire might be introduced at 
the time spectrum is auctioned. The availability of additional spectrum in 
future acquired via trading or auctions, or new technologies such as WiMAX 
and WiFi, may also disrupt any market power in, for example, the mobile 
market. Rather than concerns over market power impeding the introduction 
of spectrum markets, spectrum markets should be seen as reducing the 
potential for market abuse. For example, HAZLETT, IBARGUEN & 
LEIGHTON (2007) found that in Guatemala spectrum markets contributed to 
increased competition and lower prices.   
Under-used spectrum 
A further concern sometimes raised is that spectrum will be purchased 
and remain unused for speculative reasons, or to prevent access to 
spectrum by others. It is not uncommon for "use it or lose it" provisions to be 
advocated but they are rarely applied because of the problems in defining 
legitimate use. Though we note that in New Zealand the government has 
determined (based on a consultant's reports) that some of the cellular rights 
in the 800 and 900 MHz bands are underused by incumbents and that these 
underused rights should be sold at auction when the existing licences expire 
(Ministry of Economic Development, 2006). 
Current non-use of at least part of a scarce resource is often optimal, 
either to allow for future growth, or because the optimal use is uncertain and 
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commitment to a particular use may involve the irreversible commitment of 
capital and other resources. An analogous example is the opportunity to 
develop vacant land, where valuable land can remain unused when real 
estate prices and the payoff from alternatives is uncertain (TITMAN, 1985).  
Less than full utilisation of a frequency band also makes spectrum re-
planning easier. Use it or lose it provisions may therefore reduce the social 
value of spectrum. Fixed capital build out commitments or timing constraints 
with respect to usage in relation to spectrum allocations may also reduce the 
social value of spectrum, since flexibility itself has value (TRIGEORGIS, 
1996). 
A special case, however, are the legacy holdings of spectrum by 
government users including the military. There is no reason to presume that 
under use (or use) is optimal in this instance, and in the absence of 
opportunities to profit from trade or an explicit charge for spectrum 
government agencies could be expected to hold on to spectrum just in case, 
even where such holdings are inefficient. 
Legitimate concerns 
A number of legitimate public policy concerns arise in relation to moves 
to a more market based approach to spectrum allocation and reallocation, 
some of which may require complementary changes to institutional 
arrangements, whilst others may require a departure from a purely market 
based allocation of spectrum. We consider the question of whether spectrum 
should be reserved for "unlicensed" use as a public commons, the 
interaction with publicly funded outputs such as broadcasting and defence, 
and incumbency issues. 
Spectrum commons 
A number of economically valuable applications of spectrum involve use 
of a spectrum common, for example public WiFi, RFID and many consumer 
applications such as baby alarms and garage door openers.  In these 
instances it may not be feasible for users to band together and pay for 
spectrum collectively due to the transaction costs involved. Given this, the 
reservation of spectrum for public commons must be decided 
administratively based on an assessment of the costs and benefits involved. 
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Estimates of the net economic benefits of collective use for a number of 
applications have been produced in a study by INDEPEN, AEGIS & OVUM 
(2007) for the UK regulator Ofcom. The results indicate that the net present 
value of these benefits over the next 20 years for the EU could be 
considerable (estimated by multiplying UK estimates by the ratio of EU to UK 
GDP): 
• Home data networking: €36bn (this includes avoided costs of using 
wired systems and the benefits arising from the stimulus to broadband take-
up). 
• Public WiFi: €590bn (this includes the cost savings from not using 
cellular services for mobile internet access and the benefits from greater use 
of mobility services). 
• Automotive radar: €220bn (this includes the benefits arising from 
reductions in the number of accidents). 
• RFIDs: €200 bn (this includes the efficiency benefits to the retail 
sector alone). 
The main challenge in undertaking any assessment of costs and benefits 
is that they occur in the future and so are necessarily uncertain. This means 
the likelihood of possible outcomes occurring needs to be assessed. This 
might be done with reference to analogous past situations and gathering 
views from industry participants and potential consumers. 
Irreversibility and path dependence 
Allocations of spectrum, in particular those for licence exempt use or 
public service broadcasting, may in effect be irreversible – at least for a very 
long time. Once a commons is created and used there is no straightforward 
way to release the spectrum for another use since use is unlicensed. An 
allocation for public service broadcasting involves the irreversible 
commitment of capital by consumers and a subsequent public switch-over 
problem if equipment is not forward compatible, for example, moving from 
MPEG-2 to MPEG-4 coding. 
Consideration of irreversibility introduces path dependence into decisions 
and complicates the analysis of costs and benefits. It also implies that there 
should be no presumption of a "first mover" advantage since, should an 
irreversible decision prove mistaken it will be particularly costly. The 
standard (or static) net present value rule, under which the net present value 
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of benefits less costs is maximised, may not provide the optimal outcome in 
these circumstances. 
An expanded NPV decision rule incorporating "real options" is required 
that explicitly takes into account uncertainty, irreversibility and flexibility in 
the timing of decisions (DIXIT & PINDYCK, 1994). Whilst real options 
techniques have been applied to a range of investment problems including 
spectrum use (HARMANTZIS et al., 2006), to date there has been very 
limited application in the policy context of spectrum allocation.   
We have applied these ideas to the decision whether to release spectrum 
for licence exempt applications or not (QUOTIENT & INDEPEN, 2007). In 
figure 2 the left hand figure shows the result of applying the standard NPV 
calculation and the right hand figure shows (in stylised form) the results if the 
expanded NPV rule is applied. What these figures show is that where there 
are large uncertainties in the benefits to be had or to be forgone, it can be 
economically advantageous to wait before releasing or using spectrum and 
the optimal allocation at a point in time is likely to be smaller than a 
conventional net present value calculation would suggest. Hence, smaller 
more frequent releases of spectrum will be more appropriate than a single 
large release. 
Figure 2 - Implications of "real options" for spectrum release 
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Public sector use 
The public sector including defence is a large user of spectrum, in the UK 
accounting for over 40 per cent of the use of spectrum below 15GHz 
(OFCOM, 2007b). It is therefore important to introduce incentives for efficient 
use of spectrum in the public sector alongside a shift to market based 
incentives for private spectrum use. However, doing so may require 
additional measures since government users often face budgetary 
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constraints on their interest in and ability to use the gains from more efficient 
spectrum use for other purposes. These budget processes may also mean 
that public sector users are more responsive to the direct cost of purchasing 
spectrum or paying an annual charge for their spectrum holdings than the 
incentive provided by the "opportunity cost" of holding spectrum if trading is 
permitted. In addition, public sector users of spectrum may not be licensed in 
which case their rights of spectrum will need to be defined more precisely if 
they are to engage in market transactions and/or they are to receive 
protection from changes to rights made by their commercial spectrum 
neighbours. 
International experience of applying financial incentives to government 
users of spectrum is limited. In the US, a number of bands have been 
identified for potential reallocation from government to non-government use. 
The costs of moving government users from these to other (less highly 
desired) bands are identified and the bands are auctioned but are only 
released to private sector bidders if the revenues raised exceed 110% of the 
cost of moving the government users. This mechanism for paying for moving 
costs gives government users an incentive to move and ensures the benefit 
to the private sector exceeds the economic costs of the reallocation.  
In the UK, government users pay the same administratively determined 
spectrum prices for their spectrum access as commercial users. The recent 
Independent Audit of public sector spectrum holdings concluded that AIP is 
likely to remain a fundamental element in encouraging improved spectrum 
efficiency for public sector spectrum holdings (CAVE, 2005). Pricing has 
been introduced for defence, emergency services, science and commercial 
fixed and mobile use; and is planned for broadcast use and under 
consideration in relation to aeronautical and maritime use (which account for 
the remaining half of spectrum below 1 GHz not currently subject to 
spectrum pricing). Prices are set with reference to estimates of opportunity 
cost utilising the Indepen-Aegis methodology whereby the costs of providing 
a service are calculated assuming that less spectrum is available via an 
alternative technology or greater use of network infrastructure (INDEPEN & 
AEGIS, 2005).  
Provided public agencies can keep some of the savings from 
economising on spectrum use for a period of time incentives to economise 
are introduced by spectrum pricing whether or not the agency receives an 
initial compensating adjustment to its budget. Spectrum pricing also has the 
advantage that not all of the issues related to the definition of rights, which 
may be required to implement trading, need be resolved.  
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Removal of implicit support for activities such as public service 
broadcasting via the free availability of spectrum may also require 
adjustment to existing funding arrangements and/or regulatory requirements 
if existing levels of public service broadcasting are to be maintained. 
Arguably explicit consideration of these issues and the clarity it brings is 
beneficial. 
Incumbency issues 
The introduction of explicit rights, allowing trading and potentially 
applying pricing to spectrum must all be considered against a backdrop of 
existing spectrum use and expectations. Whilst the reallocation of economic 
rents associated with past availability of spectrum may be irrelevant from an 
overall economic efficiency perspective, proposed reforms need to be 
carefully considered having regard to reasonable investor expectations and, 
if they are to be successful, the politics of reallocations of economic surplus. 
Investment could be deterred if companies are not confident in the future 
continuation of their rights and so there could be a consequence for overall 
economic efficiency. This means the conditions for licence revocation and 
renewal must be made explicit in advance if spectrum markets are to work 
well. In addition, incumbents will incur real costs in clearing spectrum for 
new uses and these costs may need to be factored into policy decisions. 
The most direct way of doing this is for new users to compensate 
incumbents for moving though if incumbents do not have time limited rights 
problems of hold-up will occur. To avoid these problems either rights must 
be time limited (CRAMTON et al., 1998) or the sum paid for moving 
incumbents needs to be agreed by an independent third party. 
A degree of tolerance of prospective "windfalls" if rights are vested with 
existing users and become tradable might in some instances be preferable 
to the administrative and legal problems involved in reassignment. In 
particular, with hindsight digital switchover for broadcasting might have been 
made more clearly the responsibility of broadcasters if they had been 
granted existing spectrum and allowed to use surplus spectrum for additional 
channels and/or high definition TV (HDTV), or to sell the spectrum 
themselves, at switchover. The transition from analogue to digital mobile 
services was, for example, managed by the mobile operators themselves.   
Finally, pure rent seeking, by incumbents or entrants, should be 
distinguished from legitimate concerns relating to the allocation or 
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reallocation of spectrum rights and resisted. HAHN & SINGER (2007) have 
argued that efforts to impose conditions on licences in the auction of 
700MHz spectrum in the US amount to rent-seeking, and that giving the 
FCC discretion has inevitably resulted in rent seeking. Clarity over the 
limited range of legitimate grounds for intervention in a market allocation or 
inclusion of special conditions in spectrum licences will help in limiting the 
inevitable rent seeking associated with valuable rights and regulatory 
discretion. 
  Addressing all of these problems at once – allocating 
the Digital Dividend 
All of the complexities discussed above arise in relation to the migration 
from analogue to digital TV and the associated release of spectrum for new 
users. We illustrate this using the UK as a case study. Here there are: 
• Incumbent users whose interests need to be addressed, including 
existing broadcasters, programme making and special events users, radio 
astronomy and an aeronautical radar operated for commercial purposes. 
• Potential new uses of the spectrum, including licence exempt as well 
as licensed use, that are argued to generate positive public benefits (e.g. 
public service broadcasting and rural broadband), uses that require a 
particular band plan (e.g. paired spectrum for two way mobile services) and 
publicly funded organisations (e.g. radio astronomy and the BBC). 
• Spectrum reservations for six digital terrestrial TV mulitplexes, and the 
issue of whether these allocations should be made more flexible (e.g. 
tradable) arises. 
• Complex migration issues. Current digital set top boxes use MPEG-2 
compression, whereas other countries who waited have adopted MPEG-4 
compression, allowing greater flexibility in the timing and allocation of 
spectrum for mobile TV and HDTV. Furthermore, a future switchover to 
MPEG-4 will be required in the UK. 
A full market approach to reallocating this spectrum could involve either 
terminating all existing licences and then auctioning a clear block of 
spectrum (the big bang approach advocated by KWEREL & WILLIAMS, 
2002, but not adopted so far by any government) or grandfathering tradable 
rights to the existing users and letting them manage the transition through 
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trading, private spectrum auctions and funding any consumer migration 
costs. 
However, other policy measures that are beyond the scope of the 
regulator's activities may also be needed to ensure publicly funded bodies 
faced appropriate incentives to buy/sell spectrum and to address significant 
external costs/ benefits (e.g. funding or regulation targeted at these external 
effects). In addition the regulator must still decide whether licence exempt 
uses should be allocated spectrum administratively (i.e. using cost benefit 
analysis) or whether a private commons approach is preferable. If cost 
benefit analysis is applied then the benefits to all potential uses of spectrum 
need to be estimated - a considerable task. 
What has happened so far in the UK is that the regulator, Ofcom, set out 
with the intention of using an auction (of technology and service neutral 
licences) to determine the allocation of the release spectrum recognising 
where there were material social benefits from particular uses that these 
might justify some sort of intervention in the market. The difficult question 
Ofcom has tried to answer is how big are the social benefits that derive from 
access to the UHF spectrum for each of the main potential uses of the 
spectrum? 
Ofcom first estimated the private welfare benefits for each of the services 
(based on consumer market research and market modelling to estimate the 
sum of consumer and producer surplus) and then gave an indicative 
(judgemental) percentage for the uplift associated with wider social benefits. 
These benefits are judged to amount to 5-15% of the private benefits i.e. 
well within the range of errors on the private benefits. This might suggest 
that, with the possible exception of the licence exempt applications, an 
auction approach should be applied since private valuations will in a first 
approximation reflect the social value. 
However, there is a further complication raised by the prospect of HDTV.  
Whilst HDTV may not have value per se in terms of public service 
broadcasting, the viability of the terrestrial public service broadcasting 
platform might be undermined over time if HDTV were not available on the 
platform (it is currently available on satellite and cable, and may in future be 
available over fibre access networks).   
If provision of HDTV is important for the continued delivery of terrestrial 
public service broadcasting, then the question arises as to whether the main 
broadcasters could feasibly bid for it, given one broadcaster is publicly 
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funded and another is publicly owned, and whether these bids would take 
account of the public benefits from continued popularity of the terrestrial 
platform, given the other two main broadcasters are purely commercial 
organisations. If an auction is held the cost of spectrum access is not known 
in advance and there is a risk that public service broadcasters would be 
unsuccessful at auction, an outcome that might prove irreversible and lead 
to regret.   
As a general matter Ofcom argues that reserving spectrum for a 
particular purpose that generates social value is not appropriate - rather 
changes should be made to financial and institutional frameworks to ensure 
that social value is taken into account (OFCOM, 2006). While this may be 
correct in principle, there is a significant practical issue to be addressed, 
namely will such financial and institutional frameworks be put in place in 
advance of the UHF spectrum auction? 
There is also a longer term issue to consider in terms of the relationship 
between the delivery of public service broadcasting and the terrestrial 
broadcast platform. With growth in the availability and use of alternative 
platforms, the opportunity to consider terrestrial switch off and a further 
release of prime spectrum for mobile applications may arise in future. 
  How should policy makers proceed? 
Figure 3 summarises the decision process that is implied by the analysis 
given in this paper. To get to this stage, a process to achieve a degree of 
buy-in to application of a market based approach, as appropriate, is first 
required. 
A key underlying decision is whether to rely on an administrative 
allocation supported by cost benefit analysis, or to rely on the market. In 
allocating spectrum released by digital switchover in the UK a combination of 
the two might ultimately be used, but the boundary between the two 
approaches must be clear. The extent of irreversibility involved in allocating 
spectrum for licence exempt or public service broadcasting use complicates 
decision making, since there is greater potential for regret in terms of the 
future scope to allocate spectrum in response to new applications (such as 
mobile TV). Clarity over the narrow range of circumstances in which 
departure from a market based approach to allocation, or imposition of 
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special license conditions would be justified, will also help in resisting rent 
seeking by incumbents and entrants. 
Figure 3 - Decision process for deciding spectrum allocation policy 
Are all uses commercial with 
no external effects?
Can uses be licensed?
Are there positive/negative
external effects? 
Are private commons 
feasible? Use CBA
Use market
approach
Focus policies on 
desired outputs
Are there public sector 
users?
Modify budgeting & possibly 
licensing arrangements
Yes
No  
It is clear that the introduction of market approaches to spectrum 
management can be more complex than it first appears, requiring changes 
in policies aimed at specific spectrum uses and users. The simplest 
circumstances where market approaches can be applied are where current 
and expected future uses of spectrum are purely commercial and capable of 
being licensed. Even in these circumstances legacy issues need to be 
anticipated and managed. 
Where users are in the public sector or uses generate significant external 
impacts it may also be necessary to adjust other policies that are outside the 
scope of the spectrum manager's remit. This emphasises the importance of 
wider government (and importantly Ministry of Finance) commitment to 
spectrum reform. If this commitment does not exist then continued 
intervention will be required such as spectrum reservations and/or the grant 
of "free" spectrum for public sector users and other uses generating wider 
public benefits. Judging the extent of these interventions is always 
problematic and means that over time these users have little incentive to 
change their spectrum use in response to technology and market changes. 
However, the potential prize in terms of productivity and new services is 
large, and considerable effort in addressing these more difficult policy areas 
is therefore likely to be justified. 
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